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gate a killing because it may be that the party making the threat
has relented, or abandoned his purpose, or his courage may have
failed, or the threat may .have been idle gasconade.'16 A hostile
threat made by deceased against the accused and communicated.
to him prior to the killing is admissible as bearing upon the question of the prisoner's apparent imminent danger of death or bodilyharm at the time of the killing.
While the status of uncommunicated threats has been subject
to fluctuations and contradictions in the decisions, the following
doctrines may now be regarded as well settled. First, uncommunicated threats are not admissible to justify or mitigate a homicide since they could have had no influence on the mental state
of prisoner at the time of the killing. 7 Secondly, such threats are
admissible to corroborate other evidence of communicated threats,
in so far as they tend to counteract any presumtion of fabrication
by the witness who gave the first testimony."' Lastly, in a case
where there is any doubt as to who was the aggressor, evidence of
uncommunicated threats is admissible insofar as it may tend to
show the animus of the deceased, and, in the absence of more direct
evidence, show who was the probable aggressor. 9
-M. H. M.
PERs Ns--MARRiAGE-A NULm ENT.-It may well be said that
society does not desire that the lives of two young people be ruined
because of one mistake. But on the other hand, society is vitally
interested in preserving the dignity and sacredness of the marital
relation. How can this be done if we permit people to be married
in a spirit of jest, or to avoid inconvenience or embarassment, and
then to have the status, for it is a status, dissolved at will? In a
recent West Virginia ease it appeared that at a party it was suggested, in a spirt of jest, that a young woman and man be married.
It became rumored and appeared in the press that the parties were
to have been married but had failed to do so. The next afternoon
the parties met and the man asked the girl to marry him to save
further embarassment and business inconvenience. It was agreed.
that they would be married in form only and that an annulment
would be procured as soon as possible. A license was secured
and the ceremony was performed by a minister in due form.
People v. Scroggins, 37 Cal. 676 (1869).
Carrol v. State, 28 Ala. 28, 58 Am. Dec. 282 (1853).
19 Cornelius v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. 432 (1855) ; See, WHAnToN,
1s
27

§ 695.

HOaucio,

19 Little v. State, 65 Tenn. 893, (1873) ; Wiggins v. People, 93 U. S. 465 (1873).
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The parties separated and never lived together or assumed any of
the relations or duties of marriage. A few days after the ceremony, annulment proceedings were instituted. The lower court
dismissed the plaintiff's bill. On appeal the marriage was annulled. The court in its holding says that where parties to a marriage ceremony prior thereto mutually agree that such ceremony
shall not be binding and immediately after the ceremony separate
and do not assume any of the duties of the marriage relation,
equity will annul such marriage, it appearing that such ceremony
originated in, and was consummated as the result of, a jest.1
It
would appear that there was no fraud, force or coercion used to
induce the plaintiff to enter into marriage. Consent was mutual
to enter into a marriage according to statute.2
To be sure, the
parties did not intend to be bound, and this perhaps would invalidate other contracts. But marriage is something more than an ordinary civil contract, for it creates a social status or relation.8 Not
only the contracting parties are interested, but the state as well.4
"Some courts have gone to the extent of holding that marriage is
not a contract but a status created by mutual consent of one man
and one woman and that the rights and obligations of the parties
are not contractual, but are fixed, changed or dissolved by law."
Marriage is a civil status.6 Marriage differs from other civil
contracts in that it creates a legal status and hence is not dissoluble at the will of the parties by their mutual consent or their renunciation of it. 7 The marital relation, unlike ordinary contractual relations, is regarded by the law as the basis of the social organization. The preservation of that relation is deemed essential
to the public welfare. 8 In Christian nations marriage is not treated
as a mere contract to be suspended or dissolved, at pleasure, but
rather as a status based on public necessity, and controlled by law
for the benefit of society at largeY "Marriage arises to the dignity of a social status in which society, morals, religion, reason, and
the state itself have an interest."10 It is submitted that the decision in Crouch v. Wartenberg deals too lightly with the sacred relation of marriage and, in providing for the welfare of the parties
to this suit, disregards the interests of society in keeping marriage
I Crouch v.CODE,
Wartenberg, 112 S. E. 234 (W. Va. 1922).
C. 63, § 14.
3 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 723, 31 L. Ed. 654 (1888).
' Magee v. Young, 40 Miss. 164, 90 Am. Dec. 322
(1866).
15 R. C. L. 383.
Gregory v. Gregory, 78 'Ae. 187, 3 AtI. 280 (1886).
7 Ridgley v. Rldgley, 79 Md. 298, 29 At. 597 (1894). 26 Cyc 899.
8 Adams v. Adams, 25 Minn. 72 (1878).
9 People ex rel. v. Case, 241 I1 279, 89 N. E. 638 (1909).
20 L. R. A. 1915E, 15.
2 W. VA.
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as inviolable as possible, and that a precedent is created that would
seem to lead to a letting down of the bars so that marriage may
subserve business ends or afford amusement rather than the purpose intended for it by divine and common law.
Perhaps in this particular instance the best interests of all involved will be subserved by the decision of the court. But such
decision must of necessity have a demoralizing effect upon the
young people of today. It must lessen their respect for marriage and cause them lightly to enter into marriage, thinking that
if they find such relation disagreeable they can have it annulled.
In answer to this it might be said that where there has been no
cohabitation the relation has not changed. But the matter of
proving cohabitation is met with difficulty when both parties
deny it.
The English courts grant annulment only if there is no reality
of consent and if there is consent, no fraud inducing that consent
is material. Germany, Switzerland, and some of the other European countries seem to take a much more liberal view and grant
annulment on ground of mistake in nationality or in personal
qualities and characteristics." It is not contended that the extreme
view of the English courts should be adopted, and surely, the most
liberal ones are not advisable. It would seem that the view of most
of the American courts, viz., granting annulment on the ground
of mistake, fraud, duress or some incapacity to contract, is the
wisest view.' 2 But it should not be extended.
It is not to be argued that parties unsuited to each other should
be made to live together as husband and wife. But should people
lightly enter into an illadvised marriage it would not be an uncommon or extreme punishment to require them to wait the statutory period for desertion-say, three years-to get a divorce. The
same end would be accomplished, the parties to the transaction
would have paid for their offense to society, and better example
would be set for others, for people will not be prone to thoughtlessly rush into a situation that it will take three years to change.
-R. G. K.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-NATURE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT-

proceeding by notice of motion for judgment
under Chapter 121 of the West Virginia Code is being used more
and more frequently by practitioners in this state. The reason
SUFFICIENCY.-The

21
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Moss v. Moss (1897) P. 263.
26 CYc 901.
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